Sometimes, however, it is done to avoid public debate about or external involvement in any obvious shift in Navy strategy. Often this has been done for the sake of speed and to avoid a laborious crafting of strategy. Instead of attempting to replace an existing official strategy document, SECNAVs and CNOs have issued guidance papers and directives that reinterpret or supersede some part of the existing strategy. In recent years, continuity has become very artificial. Strategies issued early in the leader’s tenure have a chance to gain effect, whereas those issued late in the tour indeed are viewed as lame ducks. This creates a churn in which strategies appear credible only as long as the chief strategist/leader remains in that position. Leaders feel pressure to sign off on their own strategy documents. In a competitive environment in which hyperbole-laced debates over resources take place, the thirst for a “new” strategy with new, “innovative” terminology and arguments is always present.
Strategy documents ultimately reflect the desired policies of the chief strategist (the CNO) thus their implementation is dependent on the tenure of the strategist, or on the willingness of his successor to maintain the same strategy without significant revision. Similar to policies issued in the final months of a lame-duck presidency, those strategy documents issued shortly before a change of Navy or DoD leadership rarely have significant impact or lasting effect. What may not be obvious is that the timing of issuing a strategy plays a major role in its overall effectiveness, let alone its effective dissemination.
Obviously, the crafting of strategy takes time. It is republished here with permission and several excerpts will be featured. The following was originally published by the Leidos Chair of Future Warfare Studies of the Naval War College under the title Crafting Naval Strategy: Observations and Recommendations for the Development of Future Strategies. Read it in its original form here.
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